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Abstract The aggregation of consistent individual judgments on logically inter-
connected propositions into a collective judgment on those propositions has recently
drawn much attention. Seemingly reasonable aggregation procedures, such as propo-
sitionwise majority voting, cannot ensure an equally consistent collective conclusion.
In this paper, we motivate that quite often, we do not only want to make a factually right
decision, but also to correctly evaluate the reasons for that decision. In other words,
we address the problem of tracking the truth. We set up a probabilistic model that
generalizes the analysis of Bovens and Rabinowicz (Synthese 150: 131–153, 2006)
and use it to compare several aggregation procedures. Demanding some reasonable
adequacy constraints, we demonstrate that a reasons- or premise-based aggregation
procedure tracks the truth better than any other procedure. However, we also illumi-
nate that such a procedure is not in all circumstances easy to implement, leaving actual
decision-makers with a tradeoff problem.
Keywords Judgment aggregation · Truth-tracking · Discursive dilemma · Reasons ·
Justification
1 Introduction
Judgment aggregation (List 2007) is an emerging research area in formal epistemol-
ogy and economics. It investigates how to aggregate individual judgments on logically
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Table 1 An illustration of the
discursive dilemma under the
constraint rule A1 ∧ A2 ↔ D
A1 A2 D
Voter 1, 2, 3 True True True
Voter 4, 5 True False False
Voter 6, 7 False True False
Majority True True False
related propositions into a collective judgment on those propositions. Examples of
groups that need to aggregate individual judgments are all kind of committees: expert
panels, legal courts, boards, and councils. The propositions are of two kinds: premises
and a conclusion. The former serve as supporting reasons to derive a judgment on the
latter. Consider, for example, a city council that has to make a decision on whether
to build a new harbor site (represented by a proposition D, the resulting decision).
This project is eligible for public funding if and only if two premises are satisfied:
first, there is sufficient request for new harbor sites that cannot be met by existing
harbor sites (represented by proposition A1), and second, the nearby marine reserve is
not badly affected (represented by proposition A2). The decision rule can be formally
expressed as the formula (A1 ∧ A2) ↔ D. Each member of the council expresses her
judgment on A1, A2 and D such that the rule (A1 ∧ A2) ↔ D is satisfied.
How shall we derive a group judgment given the individuals’ opinions on premises
and conclusion? It is assumed that each individual expresses judgments on the prop-
ositions while respecting the logical constraints. If we define the group opinion as
the majority view on the issues (premises and conclusion), it turns out that the group
may take an inconsistent position, as shown in Table 1. The city council may face
a situation where the majority thinks that the new harbor site should not be built.
However, it will not be possible to provide reasons for this judgment as a majority of
the members agrees that there is sufficient request for further harbor sites and another
majority agrees that the nearby marine reserve is not badly affected. The literature on
judgment aggregation refers to such a problem as the discursive dilemma.
We see that, although each committee member expresses a consistent opinion,
propositionwise majority voting results in a majority for A1 and A2, but in a major-
ity for ¬D.1 This is clearly an inconsistent collective result as it violates the rule
(A1 ∧ A2) ↔ D. The paradox rests with the fact that propositionwise majority voting
can lead a group of rational individuals to endorse an inconsistent collective judgment.
Clearly, the relevance of such aggregation problems goes beyond the specific example:
it applies to all situations where individual binary evaluations need to be combined
into a judgment of the entire group.
The discursive dilemma is the point of departure of two different research programs.
The first program investigates the general scope of judgment aggregation functions. For
instance, recent results demonstrate that reasonable constraints such as collective ratio-
nality (the group judgment satisfies the logical constraint rule) and non-dictatorship
1 For reasons of simplicity, we represent propositional variables as well as realizations of those variables
by capital letters in italics.
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cannot hold jointly, if conjoined with some plausible independence constraints (List
and Pettit 2002; Dietrich and List 2006). Thus, the first program methodically assim-
ilates judgment aggregation problems to preference aggregation problems, and has
a natural focus on (im)possibility theorems like Arrow’s theorem. We pursue, how-
ever, the hands-on approach of the second program. Here, various ways to consis-
tently aggregate judgments are evaluated from an epistemic perspective (Bovens and
Rabinowicz 2006). So the focus is rather on concretely comparing the epistemic per-
formance of actual procedures, than on investigating what kind of procedures can, or
cannot, exist.
Two epistemic goals have to be discerned. The first, and foremost goal consists in
making the right decision (i.e., to build or not to build harbor site). The second, more
demanding goal consists in making decisions that track the truth: that is, not only do
we adopt the factually right decision, we also judge all propositions in the agenda
correctly. We address the first goal in Hartmann et al. (2010). Here, we focus on the
problem of substantiating the right decision by an correct overall judgment.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 motivates the need for substantiat-
ing decisions by procedures that track the truth, and introduces part of our formal
framework. Section 3 generalizes the probabilistic model of Bovens and Rabinowicz
(2006). Section 4 contains our analytical result and establishes the superiority of a rea-
sons-based procedure for tracking the truth. Finally, Section 5 discusses the practical
implementation of the analyzed aggregation procedures and summarizes our insights.
2 Two methods of judgment aggregation
In the discursive dilemma presented in Sect. 1, we have identified an admissible judg-
ment set with a consistent judgment on the sets of propositions at stake (see Table 1).
We now define aggregation functions over general judgment aggregation problems.
The following definitions will help us to attain this goal (see also Miller and Osherson
2009).
Definition 1 The agenda is a set of propositions on which judgments are to be made.
In our paper, we focus on agendas of the form A = {A1, . . . , AM , D} where the
Ai are called the premises, and D is called the decision:
Definition 2 A logical constraint rule L on an agenda A = {A1, . . . , AM , D} is a
well-formed formula of propositional logic that (1) represents D as a truth-functional
compound of the other elements of A and (2) preserves the logical independence of
the Ai .
Together, A and L determine a judgment aggregation problem. Here, we have
demanded that the A1, . . . , AN are logically independent, but that D is equivalent to
some truth-functional compound of them. This restriction has been made in order to
treat the judgment aggregation problem as a decision problem, where the final decision
depends in some non-trivial way on a set of premises that are assumed as independent
of each other (e.g., standing for different facts of the matter).
123
212 Synthese (2012) 187:209–221
Definition 3 A judgment set or situation valuation S is an ordered set of true/false
valuations of the propositions in A. Let J denote the set of all judgment sets.
Definition 4 An admissible judgment set or admissible situation valuation S, given a
logical constraint rule L , is an ordered set of true/false valuations of the propositions
in A such that these valuations respect L . Let J L• denote the set of all admissible
judgment sets under the logical constraint rule L .
Definition 5 For a group of N members and a logical constraint rule L , an admissible
judgment profile is an element of (J L• )N .
Thus, judgment sets assign truth values to all propositions in the agenda. In other
words, they evaluate all relevant aspects of a given situation—therefore the synonym
situation valuation. A judgment set xi is admissible if and only if it conforms to the
logical constraints, and a judgment profile (x1, . . . , xN ) is the vector which contains
all individual judgment sets.
Now, we can define a judgment aggregation function f :
Definition 6 For a group of N members with agenda A and logical constraint rule L ,
a function f : (J L• )N → J L• is called a judgment aggregation function/procedure.
The goal of our paper consists in comparing different ways of aggregating N admis-
sible judgment sets into a single judgment set such that not only the resulting decision
D, but the entire situation is judged correctly. Thus, our aggregation function f should
aim at the following property:
Truth-Tracking (TT): For any admissible situation valuation S ∈ J L• , if S were
true, then S would be chosen.
An aggregation procedure that satisfies this condition is said to track the truth.
This account of truth-tracking can be brought in line with Nozick (1981) account
of truth-tracking in epistemology. A judgment aggregation method tracks the truth of
a situation S if and only if two conditions are satisfied:
Stability If S were true, then S would be chosen.
Sensitivity If S were not true, then S would not be chosen.
Of course, our definition of truth-tracking satisfies Stability. Neither is it difficult to
see that Sensitivity is satisfied as well: If S were not true, then some other situation
S′ would be true, and by (TT), S′ would be chosen. A fortiori, S would not be cho-
sen, and Sensitivity is satisfied. Thus, (TT) entails Stability and Sensitivity so that
truth-tracking methods in our sense also track the truth in Nozick’s sense.
Of course, few aggregation procedures track the truth under all circumstances—
errors are part of the game. For this reason, we believe it useful to introduce a com-
parative concept of truth-tracking: an aggregation function outperforms a rival if its
(probabilistic) tendency to track the truth is higher in each situation S ∈ J L• .
Definition 7 For two aggregation procedures f and f ′, f tracks the truth better than
f ′ in a given judgment aggregation problem, if and only if, in an appropriate proba-
bility model, for any s ∈ J L• ,
P( f (x1, . . . , xN ) = s|s is true) ≥ P( f ′(x1, . . . , xN ) = s|s is true),
with inequality for at least one element of J L• .
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We will construct an appropriate probability model in the next section. For the
time being, note that truth-tracking is a stronger aim than just making a factually right
decision. It means to make the right decision for the right reasons, based on a correct
assessment of the entire situation. Not in all contexts, it is obvious that reasons are
important. For example, in the initial harbor example, our desire to make a factually
correct decision might be more important than giving the correct reasons: Assume
that we believe the harbor project to be economically pointless, but that we don’t see
any problems for the environment. We therefore decide not to approve of the project.
Later, we learn that the harbor site would have been profitable, but that the nearby
marine reserve would have been affected badly. Apparently, in that context, it does
not matter whether we correctly assessed the entire situation as long as the resulting
decision—not to build the harbor site—was correct.
However, the problem of tracking the truth is important in a variety of circum-
stances, especially when institutional and individual decision-makers have to publicly
justify their decisions and when they are responsible, liable or accountable for the
decision which they have made. Such situations can be divided into two different
types: First, a right decision for the wrong reason often triggers costly revisions. Take
the case of a job applicant who is turned down for fallacious reasons. Stating wrong
reasons gives the applicant a chance to formally contest a negative decision even if she
is not a suitable candidate. Similarly, in a lawsuit, a factually right decision of the court
(e.g., to sentence the culprit) can be contested and revoked because the grounds for the
judgment are fallacious. In other words, misspecified reasons invite costly revisions.
Second, whenever decision-makers support a decision by means of their personal
or institutional authority, there is the danger of reputation loss. In academic practice,
a journal referee usually accompanies her recommendation by a list of reasons. For
instance, let us assume that the referee opts for rejection because she believes the
author’s main argument to be invalid. In fact, the author’s argument is sound, but the
paper has other deficits which the referee fails to notice. For example, the premises of
the arguments are highly contestable or relevant literature is not taken into account.
If the editor discovers that the referee’s recommendation is not well substantiated
(though factually correct), she might consider eliminating her from the journal’s list
of referees. Similarly, a city council misjudging the reasons for an accidentally correct
decision might be considered incompetent.2
Thus, in those two types of situations—formally contestable and reputation-inten-
sive decisions—truth-tracking becomes an essential issue, over and above the need to
make a factually right decision. Moreover, there are not only practical, but also episte-
mic drawbacks: if a correct decision is generated by fallacious beliefs (e.g., because
the errors cancel out each other), we will hesitate to say that this decision was justified.
Now, we investigate two different approaches to judgment aggregation. From the
preceding analysis of the discursive dilemma in Bovens and Rabinowicz (2006), List
(2005), List (2006) and Pigozzi (2006), two procedures are known: the premise-based
procedure fP and the conclusion-based procedure fC . Recall that the agenda of the
version of the discursive dilemma discussed in this paper is A = {A1, A2, D}, with
2 An overlap between both situations—costly revisions and reputation loss—is, by the way, possible, but
not necessary.
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the constraint rule L = (A1 ∧ A2) ↔ D. fP determines the aggregate vote on A1 and
A2 by simple majority voting, and fixes the collective judgment on A according to the
constraint (A1 ∧ A2) ↔ D. In conclusion-based reasoning, however, the members
decide privately on A1 and A2 and only express their opinions on D publicly. The
judgment of the group is then inferred from applying the majority rule to the individual
judgments on D. Thus, fC only yields a decision, and no judgment on the premises,
implying that it cannot track the true situation.
Consequently, Bovens and Rabinowicz (2006) introduce a novel procedure which
we call modified conclusion-based procedure fM . That procedure opts for situation
s ∈ J L• if and only if more than half of the group members support s (Bovens and
Rabinowicz 2006, p. 139). In other words, situation s is selected if and only if backed
by an absolute majority of group members. Consequently, fM gives an indeterminate
result when there is only a relative, but no absolute majority for a specific situation. In
their calculations of the truth-tracking performance of fM (formula (21) on p. 139),
Bovens and Rabinowicz treat those indeterminate cases as cases in which fM gives a
wrong result. Since indeterminate decisions count as fallacious decisions, it is not sur-
prising that their analysis appraises the truth-tracking abilities of fP over those of fM .
So, instead of appraising fP prematurely, Bovens and Rabinowicz should amend fM
to a well-defined procedure without indeterminate cases and compare that procedure
to fP . Unlike the comparison in their paper, this would be a fair contest.
We close this gap in our paper. More precisely, we compare a large class of judgment
aggregation procedures among which two procedures deserve special mention. The
first is the premise-based procedure fP which adopts, for each proposition A1, . . . , AN
in the agenda, the judgment that is backed by a majority of group members. Then,
the judgment on the decision D is inferred from these judgments. More, precisely, for
x1, . . . , xN ∈ J L• and j ≤ M3:
fP (x1, . . . , xN )( j) =
{
‘true’ #{i |x ( j)i = ‘true’} > #{i |x ( j)i = ‘false’}
‘false’ otherwise
and in addition, fP (x1, . . . , xN )(m+1) is chosen such that fP (x1, . . . , xN ) is in J L• .
However, in some circumstances, fP may be hard to implement, especially when
the decision-making body is no back-room committee, but gathers in public (such as
legislative bodies, public councils, etc.). Take, for instance, a motion that advances
a certain resolution but also takes a stand on the reasons for the desired decision.
fP , if properly implemented, would require that the motion be split and that the final
decision be inferred from the single ballots. This is twofold difficult: First, it may
be impractical and time-consuming to split a complex motion. Second, should we
really infer the conclusion rather than vote on it? As witnessed by Table 1, there can
be a majority for each premise, but no majority for the corresponding decision—this
was the source of the discursive dilemma. Hence, the decision-makers might end
up with an inconsistent collective judgment (if they also vote on the decision), and
there is, in general, no institution which could compel them to be logically consistent.
3 N is, for the sake of convenience, assumed to be odd.
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In particular, fP can lead to decisions that are backed by only a small minority of the
group members (see Table 1, and similar examples).
A natural alternative is the situation-based procedure fS which applies the plural-
ity rule to selecting a peculiar judgment set or situation valuation. Such a procedure
avoids the objections listed above: the group judgment corresponds to the judgment
set that is backed by most voters (“first past the post”). This is a natural general-
ization of the rationale underlying fC and fM . It is also frequently found in the
practice of decision-making, for example, whenever several draft motions are bal-
loted. (Think of “The city council approves of constructing new harbor sites because
close analysis has demonstrated both the economic profitability and the ecological
sustainability of the project.” vs. “Although the economic profitability of new harbor
sites cannot be denied, the city council does not approve of the project, because the
consequences for the nearby marine reserve would be too damaging” etc.) Hence, we
define fS(x1, . . . , xN ) = s ∈ J L• such that s satisfies either
#{i |xi = s} > max
s′∈J L• \s
#{i |xi = s′} (1)
or, if equality in (1) holds between s and s′,
min
i≤N {i |xi = s} < mini≤N {i |xi = s
′}. (2)
Thus, in the case of a tie between different judgment sets, the group member with
the lowest number decides the day. This is a purely conventional tie-breaking rule.
Both fP and fS satisfy anonymity (with the exception of tie-breaks in the case of
fS), non-dictatorship and collective rationality, that is, conditions that are really indis-
pensable for any aggregation function that might be applied in democratic practice.
The next section presents a formal model that allows us to compare the truth-tracking
performance of fP and fS according to Definition 7.
3 The probabilistic model
In order to investigate the epistemic reliability of the various aggregation procedures,
we adopt a probabilistic framework. In particular, we assign to every group member
the competence p ∈ (0, 1) to make a correct judgment on a single premise, regard-
less of whether that premise is true or false.4 More precisely, when a premise Ai is
factually true, the group member submits a correct judgment with probability p, and
equally, if the premise is false, the group member submits a correct judgment with
probability p. This way, the competence of an individual group member is decoupled
from the prior probability of the propositions at stake, and the probability of making
4 Note that we ascribe an individual competence only for voting on premises only, which play the role of
‘elementary’ matter-of-fact propositions from which a comprehensive judgment set is derived.
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correct or incorrect judgments does not depend on the truth values of the propositions
in question.5
The Condorcet Jury Theorem links the competence of the group members to the
reliability of majority voting: Assume that the individual votes on a proposition A are
independent of each other, conditional on the truth or falsity of that proposition. If the
chance that an individual group member correctly judges the truth or falsity of A is
greater than fifty percent (in other words, p > 0.5), then majority voting eventually
yields the right collective judgment on A with increasing size of the group (N → ∞).
The Condorcet Jury Theorem thus offers an epistemic justification to majority voting
and motivates the use of the premise- and situation-based procedure in the judgment
aggregation problem (Bovens and Rabinowicz 2006). It should be noted, though,
that an application of the Condorcet results to judgment aggregation requires further
assumptions in order to reduce computational complexity, in particular:
1. A1, . . . , AM are logically independent—see Dietrich and Mongin (2010) and
Mongin (2011) for generalizations.
2. All agents have the same competence p to assess the truth of a single premise Ai .
Their judgments on the premises are independent.
3. Each individual judgment set is logically consistent.
Notably, we can relax the conditions of Bovens and Rabinowicz (2006) and Hartmann
et al. (2010) who also demand that the marginal probabilities of the premises be equal,
and that the premises be probabilistically independent. Let q : J L• → [0, 1] be an
assignment of prior probabilities to each judgment set, and for any s ∈ J L• , let Ps
denote the probability distribution over the individual judgments that is induced by s
being the correct judgment set. Evidently, for any aggregation function f , its mean
reliability Rp,q( f ) can be computed as
Rp,q( f ) :=
∑
s∈J L•
q(s) Ps( f (x1, . . . , xN ) = s), (3)
and similarly for fS .
4 The results
With the above model at hand, we investigate the reliability and truth-tracking prop-
erties of a general class of aggregation functions.
Definition 8 A function g : J L• → J g(L)• is a swap function if and only if there is a
set I ⊂ {1, 2, 3..., M} such that for all s ∈ J L• :
g(s)( j) =
{
s( j) if j /∈ I
¬s( j) if j ∈ I
5 If the probabilities for tracking the truth of Ai and ¬Ai differed, one of Nozick’s subjunctive conditionals
(see page 212) could be violated, and the agents might be bad at tracking the truth. This violation can occur
even if the overall reliability p is high (List 2006).
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where g(L) is defined as the logical constraint rule that emerges by replacing every
occurrence of A j in L with ¬A j for all j ∈ I.
Fact 1 Any swap function g : J L• → J g(L)• is a bijection. In particular, for any swap
function g and each s′ ∈ J g(L)• , there is an s ∈ J L• such that s′ = g(s).
Definition 9 An aggregation function f is unbiased if and only if for any swap func-
tion g and any judgment profile (x1, . . . , xN ) ∈ (J L• )N :
f (g(x1), . . . , g(xN )) = g( f (x1, . . . , xN )). (4)
Unbiasedness implies that the judgments of the group members are the only deter-
minant of whether or not reason A1, A2, etc. is inferred. In other words, external
biases, such as the desirability of an outcome, do not affect the procedure.6 Thus,
unbiasedness is complementary to anonymity—unbiased procedures don’t look at the
desirability of a certain proposition to be true or false, in the same way that anonymous
aggregation procedures don’t look at the name of the person who submitted a judgment
set (Mongin 2008). This property motivates our focus on unbiased procedures in the
sequel. First, it turns out that fP and fS are—as expected—in the class of unbiased
aggregation functions:
Proposition 1 fP and fS are unbiased aggregation functions.
Second, we prove that prior probabilities do not affect the mean reliability of an
unbiased procedure:
Theorem 1 The mean reliability and truth-tracking abilities of an unbiased aggre-
gation function f are independent of the prior probability distribution q(·) over the
admissible judgment sets.
In other words, for unbiased procedures, the prior probabilities of propositions or
judgment sets do not matter with respect to their epistemic performance. This is a
very helpful property since, if decision-making depended on the prior probabilities
of a given proposition, we would leave the judgment aggregation framework in favor
of a (more general) probability aggregation framework. Besides, “biased” procedures
remain stuck with a bias in favor of a particular proposition, and are hard to generalize.
Thus, we obtain two further reasons for focusing on unbiased procedures only.
Finally, we can demonstrate the superiority of fP over all other unbiased proce-
dures:
Theorem 2 Let the group members be individually be more competent than random-
izers (i.e., p > 0.5). The premise-based procedure fP is better at tracking the true
situation than any other unbiased procedure, for any value of N and p, and for any
prior probability distribution q(·) over the admissible judgment sets.
6 Another natural way to define unbiasedness would demand that the inferred judgment be invariant under
permutations of the premises, relative to the induced logical constraint rule. As it will turn out, the procedures
on which we focus satisfy that property, too, but it is not required for showing our main results.
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Remark The theorem implies that for p > 0.5, fP always outperforms fS . However,
if the group members are severely biased against the truth (p < 0.5), fP will be
inferior to fS , as the proof of Theorem 2 makes clear.
In other words, if the group members are, on an individual level, not biased against
the truth, (i.e., in the mean, they track the truth more often than falsehood), then fP
is the best truth-tracking procedure among all aggregation procedures that are just
functions of the judgment profiles, and do not have an inclination towards a specific
situation. In particular, it is superior to fS and related procedures, and it has a higher
mean reliability as well.
5 Discussion and summary
In this paper, we have approached the problem of judgment aggregation from an epi-
stemic perspective and examined the problem of tracking the truth and selecting the
right situation, over and above selecting the right decision. First we have motivated
that there are relevant circumstances where truth-tracking becomes an issue, namely
situations where costly revisions or loss of reputation threaten. Second, we have argued
against the analysis of the truth-tracking problem in Bovens and Rabinowicz (2006).
Third, we have motivated to narrow down our analysis to a particular class of aggre-
gation functions—namely unbiased functions that are not biased in favor of a specific
situation or proposition. We take this, analogous to anonymity, as a reasonable ade-
quacy constraint on aggregation functions. Among these procedures, we have focused
our attention on two natural aggregation rules that exemplify two different heuristics,
namely the premise- or reasons-based procedure fP , and the situation-based proce-
dure fS . Finally, we have set up and investigated a probabilistic model to evaluate
unbiased procedures with respect to their ability to track the truth.
Our analytic findings demonstrate that the premise-based procedure fP has uni-
formly the best truth-tracking properties among all unbiased aggregation function.
In other words, fP dominates all other unbiased procedures. This result vindicates the
importance of reasons in decision-making (see also Hartmann et al. 2010 for a simi-
lar result with respect to overall reliability in judgment aggregation). More precisely,
our findings suggest that when a decision depends on several independent factors,
it is preferable to vote on these factors separately, and to derive a decision from these
individual ballots, instead of voting on all possible judgment sets. Committees might
want to discuss the premises in advance in order to achieve consensus on the reasons
for a decision.
However, there are some drawbacks, too. fP may be hard to implement in practice,
and sometimes endorses judgment sets that only a tiny fraction of the group supports.
If the social or political circumstances require considerable support for the entire judg-
ment set, fP may be inappropriate and could be replaced by fS , for instance. Indeed,
numerical results indicate that fS is often only marginally less reliable than fP .
To sum up, in a general judgment aggregation problem, an epistemic perspec-
tive ranks the premise-based procedure fP always above fS and other unbiased pro-
cedures; but these gains are often small and have to be balanced against losses in
terms of feasibility. These losses may be negligible for non-public committees that are
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interested in tracking the truth, but severe for committees that hold their meetings in
public, and where decision-making is constrained by certain formal procedures.
Acknowledgments We thank Horacio Arlo-Costa for his kind invitation to submit to this issue of Syn-
these, and Thomas Grundmann, Carlo Martini, Philippe Mongin, Gabriella Pigozzi and an anonymous
referee for their helpful feedback. Research on this project was supported by the Veni Grant 016.104.079
‘An Objective Guide for Public Policy’ by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO).
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncom-
mercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
A Proofs
Proof of Fact 1 A swap function swaps the valuation of one or several premises and
is therefore injective. Moreover, J L• and J g(L)• have equal cardinality, because g(L)
differs from L only in replacing every A j in L by ¬A j ( j ∈ I). But all injective maps
between sets of equal cardinality are bijective as well. unionsq
Lemma 1 Let g : J L• → J g(L)• be a swap function, that is, there is a set I ⊂
{1, 2, 3..., M} such that for all s ∈ J L• :
g(s)( j) =
{
s( j) if j /∈ I
¬s( j) if j ∈ I
Moreover, let Ps denote the probability distribution of an individual group member’s
judgments if the situation valuation s is the correct one. Then, for any s, s′ ∈ J•:
Ps(s
′) = Pg(s)(g(s′))
Proof of Lemma 1 By a straightforward calculation:
Ps(s
′) = p#{ j |s( j) = s′( j)} (1 − p)M− #{ j |s( j) = s′( j)}
= p#{ j |g(s)( j) = g(s′)( j)} (1 − p)M− #{ j |g(s)( j) = g(s′)( j)}
= Pg(s)(g(s′))
unionsq
Proof of Proposition 1 The unbiasedness of fP is obvious. For fS , let without loss of
generality x1 = fS(x1, . . . , xN ) (the finally chosen judgment set must be among the
submitted ones). Since g is injective, also fS(g(x1), . . . , g(xN )) = g(x1), by simple
majority reasoning. Combining both equations yields
g( fS(x1, . . . , xN )) = fS(g(x1), . . . , g(xN ))
as required. unionsq
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Proof of Theorem 1 We have to show that in our probabilistic model, the reliability
of any unbiased aggregation procedure is independent of the prior probability distri-
bution over the judgment sets. Take s, s′ ∈ J L• and let g : J L• → J g(L)• be a swap
function with s′ = g(s). Such a swap function must exist by construction. Let f be an
unbiased aggregation procedure, and let Ps be the probability distribution over (J L• )N
in case s is the correct situation. Moreover, let IC be the 0-1-indicator function that
returns 1 if C is satisfied, and 0 otherwise. Then,
Ps( f (x1, . . . , xN ) = s) =
∑
(x1,...,xN )∈(J L• )N
I f (x1,...,xN )=s Ps(x1, . . . , xN )
=
∑
(x1,...,xN )∈(J L• )N
Ig( f (x1,...,xN ))=g(s)
N∏
k=1
Ps(g−1(g(xk)))
=
∑
(x1,...,xN )∈(J L• )N
I f (g(x1),...,g(xN ))=s′
N∏
k=1
Ps′(g(xk))
=
∑
(x1,...,xN )∈
(
J g(L)•
)N I f (x1,...,xN )=s
′
N∏
k=1
Ps′(xk)
= Ps′( f (x1, . . . , xN ) = s′)
In the second line, we have made use of the independence of the group members’
judgments and the bijectivity of g. The third line has used the unbiasedness of f and
Lemma 1. The rest was straightforward, making use of the bijectivity of g once more
(the xi are just random variables, and for any L , all valuations of the propositions
A1-AM are admissible).
Hence, c := Ps( f (x1, . . . , xN ) = s) is independent of s ∈ J L• . Therefore,
Rp,q( f ) =
∑
s∈J L•
q(s) Ps( f (x1, . . . , xN ) = s)
=
∑
s∈J L•
q(s) c
= c
proving the theorem, since c is, of course, independent of q(·). unionsq
Proof of Theorem 2 To avoid unneccessary technicalities, we only sketch the proof
idea. We show with the help of a Bayesian argument that for a particular prior dis-
tribution, fP is an epistemically optimal aggregation function. Due to Theorem 1,
this entails that fP is uniformly the best among all unbiased procedures for all prior
distributions q(·).
Let q(s) = 1/ ∣∣J L• ∣∣ be a constant. Now, all judgment sets are equally likely at
the outset. This implies that not knowing which situation is the right one, the best
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thing we can do is to treat the group members’ judgments as evidence for a particular
judgment set, and to go for the judgment set with the highest posterior probability.
In this situation of indifference over prior beliefs, the judgment set with the highest
posterior corresponds to the best confirmed judgment set (as long as p > 0.5). Due
to the independence assumptions, the best confirmed judgment set is the one where
the valuations of each Ai are backed by more than the half of voters. (For the sake of
convenience, we assume N to be odd here.)
Now, observe that fP picks precisely the judgment set where each valuation of Ai is
in agreement with the majority vote. Hence, for group members that are more compe-
tent than pure randomizers (p > 0.5), the premise-based procedure fP outperforms
all other unbiased procedures. Since this effect was independent of q(·) and since,
by Theorem 1, for any unbiased aggregation procedure f, Ps( f (x1, . . . , xN ) = s)
= Ps′( f (x1, . . . , xN ) = s′), fP tracks the truth better than any other unbiased aggre-
gation procedure. unionsq
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